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Abstract 
This paper investigates strategic choices between duopolistic firms’ R&D investments and 
government’s output subsidies in an endogenous timing game with research spillovers. We show that a 
simultaneous-move game among three players appears at equilibrium if the spillovers are very low 
while government leadership with both firms’ simultaneous-move game appears otherwise. We also 
show that government followership appears unless the spillovers are low or high, while both the 
government leadership and followership outcomes are socially desirable at equilibrium. However, a 
single firm’s leadership equilibrium appears if the spillovers are high, but it causes a welfare loss. 
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1. Introduction  
Recently the rapid development of new technologies in the world has forced firms and policy 
makers to foster R&D (research and development) investments which can provide new products in the 
market places or reduce their costs during production activities. 1  Since R&D exhibits externality 
features associated with research spillovers and its significant policy implications on innovation 
activities, works on R&D policies are currently gaining importance in oligopolistic industries and have 
become highly popular in public economics.2 
Many researchers and policy makers have proposed various policies to encourage firms’ R&D 
investments and spillovers directly and indirectly. Among the effective policy alternatives in the real 
world, governments are continuously increasing subsidization toward research institutions and 
organizations.3 While the R&D subsidies have received much policy attentions, there have been some 
debates about their effectiveness.4 As an effective option, governments might choose to subsidize 
output rather than R&D performances in cases where output enhancement is politically more popular 
and more straightforward.5  
In the literature of output subsidies and R&D activities, a significant number of studies have 
concluded that the presence of R&D spillovers in which returns from R&D are inappropriate, is critical 
to assess the welfare effect of governmental intervention. For example, Lee (1998) found the 
                            
1 Regarding empirical works on the assessment of R&D activities in the literatures, See, for example, Mairesse 
and Mohnen (2004), Conte et al. (2009), Marinucci (2012), and Blanco et al. (2018). 
2 The research spillovers is usually defined as institutional and/or technological factors. A significant number of 
studies have confirmed that R&D spillovers exist and their implications on innovation and competition policy are 
presently significant in the oligopolies economies. See, for example, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien 
et al. (1992), Poyago-Theotoky (1995, 1999), Beath et al. (1998), Amir (2000), Gil Molto et al. (2011), Kesavayuth 
et al (2018), and Leal et al. (2020) among others. 
3 For instance, EU institutions have reaffirmed the commitment to R&D policies in which the budgets of the 
research Framework Programs have grown exponentially, from EUR 3.3 billion in 1984 to EUR 80 billion in 
Horizon 2020. In 2014, the Research, Innovation and Science Policy Experts (RISE) high-level group has also 
proposed double this budget, which would lead to a 7-year budget of more than EUR 120 billion in current prices 
for the next period. 
4 See Kauko (1996), Leahy and Neary (1997), Rebolledo and Sandonis (2012), and Lee and Tomaru (2017). 
5 Some examples of output subsidies include European agriculture subsidies, ethanol production subsidies in the 
United States, fertilizer subsidies, electric car production subsidies, and so on. See more discussions by World 
Trade Organization, “The Economics of Subsidies,” for background on output subsidies. 
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significance of R&D spillovers in the design of output subsidy policy under asymmetric information. 
Leahy and Neary (1997) addressed the strategic relationship between optimal output/R&D subsidies and 
firms’ R&D investments in a domestic market while Yoon and Choi (2018) considered these relations 
under international trade. Poyago-Theotoky (2002) analyzed environmental tax/subsidy policy toward 
firm’s investment on abatement technology while Haruna and Goel (2017) emphasized the role of public 
institutes and compared output and R&D subsidies in mixed markets.6 
In a formal set-up of regulatory framework between government and firms’ R&D investments, it 
is assumed that firm’s decision is sequentially chosen after the realization of subsidy policy. That is, the 
subsidy rate is exogenously fixed when the firms determine their R&D decisions in a committed policy 
setting where the government can credibly commit to its policy rule and firms maximize their objectives 
under the committed time-consistent policy framework. However, Leahy and Neary (1997) highlighted 
the firm’s strategic decision in a different timing of investment and government policy where the firm 
chooses its R&D in advance before the government announces its policy. Then, the firm might induce 
the government to adjust its non-committed policy to be favorable to the firm in a time-inconsistency 
framework.7 
This paper is the first to investigate an endogenous timing game on strategic choices between firm’s 
R&D investment and government policy.8  Specifically, in the presence of research spillovers, we 
examine an observable delay game with three-period and three-player model, extending the formulation 
of two-period and two-player model by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in a homogeneous duopoly market. 
                            
6 In the mixed markets where the public firm competes with private firms, the literature revealed the importance 
of subsidy policies in R&D competition. For example, Lee et al. (2017) examined output subsidy while Gil-Molto 
et al. (2011) considered R&D subsidy. Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) compared output and R&D subsidies, while 
Lee and Tomau (2017) analyzed the optimal policy mix of output and R&D subsidies. 
7 For more analysis, see Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1999), Lutz et al. (2000), Requate and Unold (2001, 2003), 
Dijkstra (2002), and Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak (2002). Recent works have also analyzed the 
opportunistic behaviors in different contexts where regulated firms are heterogeneous in their objectives. See, for 
example, Xu et al. (2017), Xu and Lee (2018), Lee et al. (2018), Leal et al. (2018), Garcia et al. (2018), Lian et al. 
(2018), and Escrihuela-Villar and Gutiérrez-Hita (2018). 
8 For discussions on the endogenous timing game, see Dowrick (1986), Robson (1990), Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990), Amir and Stepanova (2006), and Amir (2006). A number of works applied this game into a mixed duopoly 
model where firms have different objectives. See, White (1996), Pal (1998), Matsumura (1999), Barcena-Ruiz 
(2007), Matsumura and Ogawa (2010), Naya (2015) and Lee and Xu (2018) among others. 
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In our extended model with an R&D-relevant game, therefore, firms determine their cost reducing R&D 
investments, either simultaneously or sequentially, while the government also chooses output subsidy 
policy, either simultaneously or sequentially. And then given endogenously chosen their decisions of 
timing, both firms play Cournot output competition in the last stage. This structural enhancement of the 
model allows us to anticipate when either the government or the firm is likely to play either a leader or 
a follower in making their decisions.  
In the analysis, there are in total 27 subgames of choosing the timing of movement but our analysis 
provides the equilibrium results with 5 cases as follows. First, a simultaneous-move game among three 
players appears at equilibrium if the spillovers rate is very low while the government leadership (as a 
first-mover) equilibrium with a simultaneous-move game between the firms appears otherwise. Thus, 
the spillovers rate is crucial to determine the strategic timing of the game between the government and 
firms. In particular, if the spillovers rate is not so low, the commitment of output subsidy policy is 
attainable in an equilibrium in which both firms choose their R&D investments simultaneously after 
observing government policy. These findings are consistent to the previous results in the absence of 
governmental policy. For example, Leal et al. (2020) showed that both firms choose simultaneous game 
when the spillovers rate is low while sequential game when the spillovers rate is high.9 Our analysis 
highlights the role of government policy in determining the strategic choices of R&D activities between 
the firms. In particular, our findings show that if the spillovers rate is not low, the government has strong 
incentive to be a leader in the equilibrium.  
Second, the government followership (as a last-mover) equilibrium appears if the spillovers rate is 
intermediate. In special, the government followership equilibrium accompanying with a simultaneous-
move game between the firms appears if the spillovers rate is relatively low while the government 
followership equilibrium accompanying with a sequential-move game between the firms appears if the 
spillovers rate is relatively high. This implies that the government might not commit to output subsidy 
rate and chooses its policy option opportunistically after observing firms’ R&D investments if the 
spillovers rate is neither high nor low. This also shows a mixture of timing between the firms at 
                            
9 In the absence of government policy, Leal et al. (2020) considered an endogenous R&D timing game and showed 
that the equilibrium is contrast to the endogenous output timing game in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) who showed 
that only a sequential-move game appears at equilibrium. 
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equilibrium with government followership, either simultaneously or sequentially. Further, a sequential-
move game between firms yields that a leading firm provides higher output and R&D investment but its 
profit is lower. 
Third, if the spillovers rate is high, a single firm’s leadership with a simultaneous-move game 
between the government and the other firm might appear at equilibrium. That is, a higher spillovers rate 
might induce a firm’s leadership and thus a sequential-move game between firms. However, there are 
multiple equilibria where the government might choose to be a follower in a sequential-move game 
between the firms or a first-mover with government leadership in a simultaneous-move game between 
the firms. 
Finally, we compare the welfare effects of the equilibrium outcomes in an endogenous timing game. 
We show that either the government leadership (as a first-mover) or the government followership (as a 
last-mover) with a simultaneous-move game between the firms can provide the highest welfare if the 
spillovers rate is not high. We also show that the government followership (as a last-mover) with a 
sequential-move game between the firms can provide the highest welfare when the spillovers rate is 
intermediate. However, there is a welfare loss in the equilibrium under either a simultaneous-move game 
among three players or a single firm’s leadership with a simultaneous-move game between the 
government and the other firm. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce the basic model of a duopoly 
model with R&D investments and output subsidy. We then classified 8 subgames in an endogenous 
timing game in section 3 and analyze the fixed timing game in section 4. In section 5, we examine the 
equilibrium of an endogenous timing game and provide welfare comparisons. We conclude the paper in 
section 6. 
2. The basic model 
We consider a duopoly market in which two firms (1 and 2) produce homogeneous goods. The 
inverse demand function is denoted as 𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑄 where 𝑃 is the market price, 𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 is the 
market total output, and 𝑞𝑖 is the output of firm i=1,2. The consumer surplus is denoted as 𝐶𝑆 = 𝑄22 .  
Following d’Aspremont et al. (1988) in a standard model of cost-reducing R&D investment with 
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research spillovers, we assume that the cost functions in output production and R&D investment, 
respectively, are ex-ante identical between the firms and given as:10 
𝐶(𝑞𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) = (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽𝑥𝑗)𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖2   and   𝛤(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑟𝑥𝑖2   𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝑖 = 1,2 and  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.       (1) 
where 𝑥𝑖 is the amount of R&D investment for firm i and 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] is the R&D spillovers rate. The 
initial cost 𝑐 is reduced by each firm’s R&D investment, 𝑥𝑖, and rival’s R&D investment, 𝛽𝑥𝑗, where 𝑎 > 𝑐 > 0. This means that depending on the research spillovers rate, R&D investment not only reduces 
a firm’s own cost by 𝑥𝑖 per unit of output, but also the rival firm’s cost by 𝛽𝑥𝑗 per unit of output. Note 
that the firm has to spend 𝑥𝑖2 to implement cost-reducing R&D, due to the R&D investment causes 
decreasing returns to scale. 
We also assume that each firm receives an output subsidy, 𝑠 > 0 , which denotes the per-unit 
subsidy rate to output, financed by government. Then, the profit function of the firm is given as follows: 
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑎 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞𝑗)𝑞𝑖 − (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽𝑥𝑗)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖2 − 𝑥𝑖2 + 𝑠 𝑞𝑖,     𝑖 = 1,2 and  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.           (2) 
The social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profit minus total subsidy, 
which is given as follows: 
𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜋1 + 𝜋2 − 𝑠(𝑞1 + 𝑞2).                                                    (3) 
In this paper, we investigate the strategic choices between firm’s R&D investment and 
government’s output subsidy policy in the presence of research spillovers. We consider a multi-stage 
game where both government and firms first choose their output subsidy rate and cost reducing R&D 
investments, respectively, either simultaneously or sequentially given the rate of spillovers, and then 
later firms play Cournot competition in the last output stage. Note that we consider a simultaneous 
Cournot duopoly in output competition but allow for sequential Stackelberg games in their R&D 
investments and government’s output subsidy policy. This structural enhancement of the model allows 
us to anticipate when either the government or firm is likely to play as either a leader or a follower in 
                            
10 The model with linear demand and quadratic cost functions is a standard formulation and popularly used in the 
literature on the cost-reducing innovation. See, for example, Gil Molto et al. (2011), Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013), 
and Leal et al. (2020). 
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making their decisions regarding output subsidy policy and R&D investment, respectively.11   
3. The subgames in an endogenous choice 
In the analysis, we examine an endogenous timing between firm’s R&D investment and 
government’s output subsidy policy. We specifically extend an observable delay game in a two-period 
and two-player framework formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) into the three-period and three-
player framework where the government (G) and both firms (firm F1 and firm F2) choose their timing 
to move among 𝑇𝑘 = 1,2,3  where 𝑘 = 𝐺, 𝐹1, 𝐹2  in determining their output subsidy and R&D 
choices, respectively. If all players choose the same period, it yields the equilibrium of a simultaneous-
move game. If all players choose different period, it yields the equilibrium of a successive sequential-
move game. Otherwise, the various equilibrium of both simultaneous-move and sequential-move games 
with leadership or followership emerges. Table 1 provides the payoff matrix of the game.  
Table 1: Payoff Matrix of the Endogenous Choice Game 
Government 𝑇𝐺 = 1 𝑇𝐺 = 2 𝑇𝐺 = 3 
Firm1 
Firm2 
𝑇𝐹1 = 1 𝑇𝐹1 = 2 𝑇𝐹1 = 3 𝑇𝐹1 = 1 𝑇𝐹1 = 2 𝑇𝐹1 = 3 𝑇𝐹1 = 1 𝑇𝐹1 = 2 𝑇𝐹1 = 3 
𝑇𝐹2 = 1 (1,1,1) (1,2,1) (1,3,1) (2,1,1) (2,2,1) (2,3,1) (3,1,1) (3,2,1) (3,3,1) 
𝑇𝐹2 = 2 (1,1,2) (1,2,2) (1,3,2) (2,1,2) (2,2,2) (2,3,2) (3,1,2) (3,2,2) (3,3,2) 
𝑇𝐹2 = 3 (1,1,3) (1,2,3) (1,3,3) (2,1,3) (2,2,3) (2,3,3) (3,1,3) (3,2,3) (3,3,3) 
In the matrix, the order of parentheses indicates the timing to move, i.e., 𝑇𝑘 = 1,2,3, of each player, 𝑘 = 𝐺, 𝐹1, 𝐹2. There are 27 subgames of choosing the timing of movement (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) in total, but 
due to its symmetry, we can reduce to 8 cases as follows: 
(1) Case I: simultaneous-move game {(1,1,1), (2,2,2) and (3,3,3)} 
(2) Case II: simultaneous-move game between government and one firm and sequential-move game by 
                            
11 Regarding the sequencing R&D decisions with Cournot competition in outputs, see Amir et al. (2000) in a 
private duopoly and Leal et al. (2020) in a mixed duopoly with corporate social responsibility. 
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the other firm’s followership {(1,1,2), (1,1,3), (2,2,3); (1,2,1), (1,3,1), (2,3,2)} 
(3) Case III: simultaneous-move game between the firms and sequential-move game by the 
government’s leadership {(1,2,2), (1,3,3), (2,3,3)} 
(4) Case IV: successive sequential-move game with government’s leadership {(1,2,3), (1,3,2)} 
(5) Case V: simultaneous-move game between the firms and sequential-move game by the 
government’s followership {(2,1,1), (3,1,1), (3,2,2)} 
(6) Case VI: simultaneous-move game between government and one firm and sequential-move game 
by the other firm’s leadership {(2,1,2), (3,1,3), (3,2,3); (2,2,1), (3,3,1), (3,3,2)} 
(7) Case VII: successive sequential-move game by the government’s intermediation {(2,1,3), (2,3,1)} 
(8) Case VIII: successive sequential-move game by the government’s followership {(3,1,2), (3,2,1)} 
In each case, in the last stage of output competition both firms decide their outputs simultaneously. 
We solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of these games by backward induction. 
4. Fixed timing game 
In the last stage, given the output subsidy rate and R&D investments, the first order condition of 
the firm yields the following outputs:12 
𝑞1 = 115 (3𝑎 − 3𝑐 + 3𝑠 + 4𝑥1 − 𝑥2 − 𝑥1𝛽 + 4𝑥2𝛽) 𝑞2 = 115 (3𝑎 − 3𝑐 + 3𝑠 − 𝑥1 + 4𝑥2 + 4𝑥1𝛽 − 𝑥2𝛽)                                      (4) 
Now, we examine the 8 cases arranged in the above description, respectively, and then compare 
the equilibrium results.  
Case Ⅰ. (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2)={(1,1,1), (2,2,2), (3,3,3)} 
This case considers a simultaneous-move game in which the government and both firms are all 
followers. Then, the government chooses output subsidy to maximize social welfare in Eq. (3) while 
each firm chooses its R&D investment to maximize the profits in Eq. (2) simultaneously. The first order 
                            
12 It can be shown that the second-order conditions are satisfied. 
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conditions yield the following symmetric equilibrium outcomes between the firms: 
𝑠𝐼 = 15(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(26 − 3𝛽 + 𝛽2) 𝑥1𝐼 = 𝑥2𝐼 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(4 − 𝛽)26 − 3𝛽 + 𝛽2  
Then, putting these equilibrium results into (4) and then (2) and (3), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes 
in this case I. 
𝑞1𝐼 = 𝑞2𝐼 = 15(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(26 − 3𝛽 + 𝛽2) 𝜋1𝐼 = 𝜋2𝐼 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)2(193 + 16𝛽 − 2𝛽2)2(26 − 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2  𝑊𝐼 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)2(193 + 16𝛽 − 2𝛽2)(26 − 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2  
 
Case Ⅱ. (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2)={(1,1,2), (1,1,3), (2,2,3); (1,2,1), (1,3,1), (2,3,2)} 
This case considers a variant of sequential-move game that the government and firm i play a 
simultaneous-move game first and then firm j follows later, where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = 1,2 . Then, by 
backward induction, firm j chooses its R&D investment to maximize its profit. The resulting response 
function of firm j’s R&D is given by: 
𝑥𝑗 = 2(4 − 𝛽)(3𝑎 − 3𝑐 + 3𝑠 − 𝑥𝑖 + 4𝑥𝑖𝛽)193 + 16𝛽 − 2𝛽2  
Taking this reaction function into consideration, the government and firm i choose output subsidy 
and R&D investment, respectively and simultaneously. Then, the first order conditions yield the 
following asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between the firms: 
𝑠Ⅱ = (𝑎−𝑐)(286721+250218𝛽−3486𝛽2−14224𝛽3+684𝛽4−168𝛽5+32𝛽6)1018760+273067𝛽−87193𝛽2+24242𝛽3−3674𝛽4+884𝛽5+188𝛽6−104𝛽7+8𝛽8  𝑥𝑖Ⅱ = 2(𝑎−𝑐)(78884+11219𝛽+813𝛽2+1583𝛽3−1378𝛽4−48𝛽5+56𝛽6−4𝛽7)1018760+273067𝛽−87193𝛽2+24242𝛽3−3674𝛽4+884𝛽5+188𝛽6−104𝛽7+8𝛽8  𝑥𝑗Ⅱ = 2(𝑎−𝑐)(4−𝛽)(19475+9673𝛽−1553𝛽2+402𝛽3−16𝛽4−40𝛽5+4𝛽6)1018760+273067𝛽−87193𝛽2+24242𝛽3−3674𝛽4+884𝛽5+188𝛽6−104𝛽7+8𝛽8  
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Then, putting these equilibrium results into (4) and then (2) and (3), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes 
in this case II. 
𝑞𝑖Ⅱ = (𝑎−𝑐)(292781+139107𝛽−6831𝛽2−6154𝛽3+204𝛽4+72𝛽5−4𝛽6)1018760+273067𝛽−87193𝛽2+24242𝛽3−3674𝛽4+884𝛽5+188𝛽6−104𝛽7+8𝛽8  𝑞𝑗Ⅱ = 15(𝑎−𝑐)(19475+9673𝛽−1553𝛽2+402𝛽3−16𝛽4−40𝛽5+4𝛽6)1018760+273067𝛽−87193𝛽2+24242𝛽3−3674𝛽4+884𝛽5+188𝛽6−104𝛽7+8𝛽8  𝜋𝑖Ⅱ = 2(𝑎−𝑐)2(1517+595𝛽−69𝛽2−20𝛽3+2𝛽4)2(31841+8880𝛽−2518𝛽2+768𝛽3−228𝛽4+64𝛽5−8𝛽6)(1018760+273067𝛽−87193𝛽2+24242𝛽3−3674𝛽4+884𝛽5+188𝛽6−104𝛽7+8𝛽8)2   𝜋𝑗Ⅱ = 2(𝑎−𝑐)2(193+16𝛽−2𝛽2)(19475+9673𝛽−1553𝛽2+402𝛽3−16𝛽4−40𝛽5+4𝛽6)2(1018760+273067𝛽−87193𝛽2+24242𝛽3−3674𝛽4+884𝛽5+188𝛽6−104𝛽7+8𝛽8)2  𝑊Ⅱ = (2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(148151879270 + 125894893231𝛽 + 7660552520𝛽2 − 4916046932𝛽3 + 2354395127𝛽4 −504765428𝛽5 − 86966808𝛽6 + 39873768𝛽7 − 12992100𝛽8 − 162752𝛽9 + 783392𝛽10 − 60704𝛽11 − 12112𝛽12 +1792𝛽13 − 64𝛽14))/(1018760 + 273067𝛽 − 87193𝛽2 + 24242𝛽3 − 3674𝛽4 + 884𝛽5 + 188𝛽6 − 104𝛽7 + 8𝛽8)2  
Note that (i) qiⅡ ≥ qjⅡ , xiⅡ ≥ xjⅡ for all β ∈ [0,1]; (ii) πiⅡ >< πjⅡ if β <> 0.25 . It implies that the 
leading firm provides higher output and R&D investment regardless of research spillovers rate while its 
profit is lower (higher) when the spillover rate is high (low). 
Case Ⅲ. (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2)={(1,2,2), (1,3,3), (2,3,3)) 
This case considers a variant of sequential-move game that the government is a leader while both 
firms follow and then choose R&D to maximize their profits by observing the output subsidy rate. The 
first order conditions of the firms yield the following response functions: 
𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐 + 𝑠)(4 − 𝛽)67 − 6𝛽 + 2𝛽2  
Using these reaction functions, the government chooses output subsidy to maximize social welfare. 
Then, the first order condition yields the following symmetric equilibrium outcomes between the firms: 
𝑠Ⅲ = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(217 + 154𝛽 − 38𝛽2)788 − 244𝛽 + 68𝛽2  𝑥1Ⅲ = 𝑥2Ⅲ = 15(𝑎 − 𝑐)(4 − 𝛽)394 − 122𝛽 + 34𝛽2 
Then, putting these equilibrium results into (4) and then (2) and (3), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes 
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in this case III. 
𝑞1Ⅲ = 𝑞2Ⅲ = 225(𝑎 − 𝑐)788 − 244𝛽 + 68𝛽2 𝜋1Ⅲ = 𝜋2Ⅲ = 225(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(193 + 16𝛽 − 2𝛽2)8(197 − 61𝛽 + 17𝛽2)2  𝑊Ⅲ = 225(𝑎 − 𝑐)2788 − 244𝛽 + 68𝛽2 
Case Ⅳ. (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2)={(1,2,3), (1,3,2)} 
This case considers a successive sequential-move game with the government’s leadership. Then, 
by backward induction, firm j chooses R&D investment to maximize its profit. The first order condition 
provides the response function of firm j’s R&D: 
𝑥𝑗 = 2(4 − 𝛽)(3𝑎 − 3𝑐 + 3𝑠 − 𝑥𝑖 + 4𝑥𝑖𝛽)193 + 16𝛽 − 2𝛽2  
Taking this response function into consideration, firm i chooses R&D investment to maximize its 
profit. The first order condition provides the response function of firm i’s R&D: 
𝑥𝑖 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐 + 𝑠)(1924 + 39𝛽 + 62𝛽2 + 32𝛽3 − 36𝛽4 + 4𝛽5)31841 + 8880𝛽 − 2518𝛽2 + 768𝛽3 − 228𝛽4 + 64𝛽5 − 8𝛽6 
Using these two response functions of the firms, the government chooses output subsidy to 
maximize social welfare. The first order condition yields the following asymmetric equilibrium 
outcomes between the firms: 
𝑠Ⅳ = (𝑎−𝑐)(48909433+71999516𝛽+12402940𝛽2−5526068𝛽3+1733908𝛽4−537704𝛽5−116984𝛽6+72400𝛽7−25088𝛽8+5088𝛽9−352𝛽10)12(14851035+6166730𝛽−1962522𝛽2+323914𝛽3+10604𝛽4−45852𝛽5+42340𝛽6−14632𝛽7+3624𝛽8−656𝛽9+48𝛽10)   𝑥𝑖Ⅳ = (𝑎−𝑐)(7133+2596𝛽−510𝛽2+124𝛽3−28𝛽4)(1924+39𝛽+62𝛽2+32𝛽3−36𝛽4+4𝛽5)6(14851035+6166730𝛽−1962522𝛽2+323914𝛽3+10604𝛽4−45852𝛽5+42340𝛽6−14632𝛽7+3624𝛽8−656𝛽9+48𝛽10)  𝑥𝑗Ⅳ = (𝑎−𝑐)(4−𝛽)(3388175+2502774𝛽−122546𝛽2−13828𝛽3+56640𝛽4−31520𝛽5+5864𝛽6−1056𝛽7+112𝛽8)6(14851035+6166730𝛽−1962522𝛽2+323914𝛽3+10604𝛽4−45852𝛽5+42340𝛽6−14632𝛽7+3624𝛽8−656𝛽9+48𝛽10)  
Then, putting these equilibrium results into (4) and then (2) and (3), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes 
in this case IV. 
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𝑞𝑖Ⅳ = (𝑎−𝑐)(50936753+36527462𝛽+765302𝛽2−1550452𝛽3+159320𝛽4−70912𝛽5−88𝛽6+1952𝛽7−112𝛽8)12(14851035+6166730𝛽−1962522𝛽2+323914𝛽3+10604𝛽4−45852𝛽5+42340𝛽6−14632𝛽7+3624𝛽8−656𝛽9+48𝛽10)  𝑞𝑗Ⅳ = 5(𝑎−𝑐)(3388175+2502774𝛽−122546𝛽2−13828𝛽3+56640𝛽4−31520𝛽5+5864𝛽6−1056𝛽7+112𝛽8)4(14851035+6166730𝛽−1962522𝛽2+323914𝛽3+10604𝛽4−45852𝛽5+42340𝛽6−14632𝛽7+3624𝛽8−656𝛽9+48𝛽10)  𝜋𝑖Ⅳ = (𝑎−𝑐)2(31841+8880𝛽−2518𝛽2+768𝛽3−228𝛽4+64𝛽5−8𝛽6)(263921+167382𝛽−7176𝛽2−5704𝛽3+1224𝛽4−528𝛽5+56𝛽6)272(14851035+6166730𝛽−1962522𝛽2+323914𝛽3+10604𝛽4−45852𝛽5+42340𝛽6−14632𝛽7+3624𝛽8−656𝛽9+48𝛽10)2   𝜋𝑗Ⅳ = (𝑎−𝑐)2(193+16𝛽−2𝛽2)(3388175+2502774𝛽−122546𝛽2−13828𝛽3+56640𝛽4−31520𝛽5+5864𝛽6−1056𝛽7+112𝛽8)272(14851035+6166730𝛽−1962522𝛽2+323914𝛽3+10604𝛽4−45852𝛽5+42340𝛽6−14632𝛽7+3624𝛽8−656𝛽9+48𝛽10)2  𝑊Ⅳ = (𝑎−𝑐)2(7133+2596𝛽−510𝛽2+124𝛽3−28𝛽4)212(14851035+6166730𝛽−1962522𝛽2+323914𝛽3+10604𝛽4−45852𝛽5+42340𝛽6−14632𝛽7+3624𝛽8−656𝛽9+48𝛽10)  
Note that (i) qiⅣ ≥ qjⅣ, xiⅣ ≥ xjⅣ for all β ∈ [0,1]; (ii) πiⅣ >< πjⅣ if β <> 0.25. Thus, the same results 
with Case II occur under the asymmetric outcomes. 
Case Ⅴ. (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2)={(2,1,1), (3,1,1), (3,2,2)} 
This case considers a variant of sequential-move game with the government’s followership in 
which both firms choose R&D before government decides the output subsidy rate. Then, by backward 
induction, the government chooses the output subsidy to maximize social welfare. The first order 
condition provides the response function of the government: 
𝑠 = 18 (2𝑎 − 2𝑐 + (𝑥1 + 𝑥2)(1 + 𝛽)) 
Using this, both firms choose R&D to maximize their profits simultaneously. The first order 
condition yields the following symmetric equilibrium outcomes between the firms: 
𝑠Ⅴ = 12(𝑎 − 𝑐)41 − 6𝛽 + 𝛽2 𝑥1Ⅴ = 𝑥2Ⅴ = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(7 − 𝛽)41 − 6𝛽 + 𝛽2  
Then, putting these equilibrium results into (4) and then (2) and (3), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes 
in this case V. 
𝑞1Ⅴ = 𝑞2Ⅴ = 12(𝑎 − 𝑐)41 − 6𝛽 + 𝛽2 𝜋1Ⅴ = 𝜋2Ⅴ = (𝑎 − 𝑐)2(239 + 14𝛽 − 𝛽2)(41 − 6𝛽 + 𝛽2)2  
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𝑊Ⅴ = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(239 + 14𝛽 − 𝛽2)(41 − 6𝛽 + 𝛽2)2  
Case Ⅵ. (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2)={(2,1,2), (3,1,3), (3,2,3); (2,2,1), (3,3,1), (3,3,2)} 
This case considers a variant of sequential-move game where firm i moves first and then both the 
government and firm j follow simultaneously. The first order conditions of the government and firm j 
provide the following response functions:  
𝑠 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(41 + 5𝛽 − 𝛽2) + 𝑥𝑖(37 + 47𝛽 + 8𝛽2 − 2𝛽3)2(152 + 11𝛽 − 𝛽2)  𝑥𝑗 = (4 − 𝛽)(6𝑎 − 6𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖(1 − 7𝛽))152 + 11𝛽 − 𝛽2  
Using these response functions, firm i chooses R&D to maximize its profits. The first order 
condition yields the following asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between the firms: 
𝑠Ⅵ = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(11129 + 3922𝛽 − 681𝛽2 + 268𝛽3 − 58𝛽4)38287 + 8646𝛽 − 3335𝛽2 + 1020𝛽3 − 342𝛽4 + 128𝛽5 − 16𝛽6 𝑥𝑖Ⅵ = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(3293 + 483𝛽 + 304𝛽2 + 34𝛽3 − 72𝛽4 + 8𝛽5)38287 + 8646𝛽 − 3335𝛽2 + 1020𝛽3 − 342𝛽4 + 128𝛽5 − 16𝛽6 𝑥𝑗Ⅵ = 4(𝑎 − 𝑐)(4 − 𝛽)(367 + 133𝛽 − 30𝛽2 + 20𝛽3 − 4𝛽4)38287 + 8646𝛽 − 3335𝛽2 + 1020𝛽3 − 342𝛽4 + 128𝛽5 − 16𝛽6 
Then, putting these equilibrium results into (4) and then (2) and (3), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes 
in this case VI. 
𝑞𝑖Ⅵ = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(5624 + 1927𝛽 − 231𝛽2 − 32𝛽3 + 2𝛽4)38287 + 8646𝛽 − 3335𝛽2 + 1020𝛽3 − 342𝛽4 + 128𝛽5 − 16𝛽6 𝑞𝑗Ⅵ = 30(𝑎 − 𝑐)(367 + 133𝛽 − 30𝛽2 + 20𝛽3 − 4𝛽4)38287 + 8646𝛽 − 3335𝛽2 + 1020𝛽3 − 342𝛽4 + 128𝛽5 − 16𝛽6 𝜋𝑖Ⅵ = 4(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(37 + 10𝛽 − 2𝛽2)238287 + 8646𝛽 − 3335𝛽2 + 1020𝛽3 − 342𝛽4 + 128𝛽5 − 16𝛽6 𝜋𝑗Ⅵ = 8(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(193 + 16𝛽 − 2𝛽2)(367 + 133𝛽 − 30𝛽2 + 20𝛽3 − 4𝛽4)2(38287 + 8646𝛽 − 3335𝛽2 + 1020𝛽3 − 342𝛽4 + 128𝛽5 − 16𝛽6)2 𝑊Ⅵ = (4(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(104404857 + 82160894𝛽 + 908031𝛽2 − 960888𝛽3 + 1753338𝛽4 − 754440𝛽5 +196548𝛽6 − 32448𝛽7 − 7224𝛽8 + 2304𝛽9 − 128𝛽10))/(38287 + 8646𝛽 − 3335𝛽2 + 1020𝛽3 − 342𝛽4 +128𝛽5 − 16𝛽6)2  
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Note that (i) qiⅥ ≥ qjⅥ , xiⅥ ≥ xjⅥ  for all β ∈ [0,1]; (ii) πiⅥ >< πjⅥ  if β <> 0.193 . Thus, the same 
results with Case II occur under the asymmetric outcomes, but the threshold of spillovers rate is lower. 
Case Ⅶ. (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2)={(2,1,3), (2,3,1)} 
This case considers a successive sequential-move game where firm i moves firstly, the government 
moves secondly and then firm j follows lastly. Then, firm j decides its R&D investment to maximize its 
profit. The first order condition provides the following response function: 
𝑥𝑗 = 2(4 − 𝛽)(3𝑎 − 3𝑐 + 3𝑠 − 𝑥𝑖 + 4𝑥𝑖𝛽)193 + 16𝛽 − 2𝛽2  
Using this response function, the government chooses subsidy to maximize welfare. The first order 
condition provides the following response function: 
𝑠 = 2(𝑎−𝑐)(1661+967𝛽−51𝛽2−74𝛽3+8𝛽4)+𝑥𝑖(1273+3789𝛽−130𝛽2+206𝛽3−132𝛽4+16𝛽5)12(1042+109𝛽−24𝛽2+8𝛽3−𝛽4)   
Using these response functions, firm i chooses R&D to maximize its profits. The first order 
condition yields the following asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between the firms: 
𝑠Ⅶ = 3(𝑎−𝑐)(−6139027−5415180𝛽−82967𝛽2+281048𝛽3−46074𝛽4+10192𝛽5+3056𝛽6−1008𝛽7+64𝛽8)−65121239−16333554𝛽+6705577𝛽2−1412924𝛽3+22684𝛽4−17840𝛽5−40772𝛽6+11440𝛽7+568𝛽8−288𝛽9+16𝛽10  𝑥𝑖Ⅶ = 2(𝑎−𝑐)(5480921+2154286𝛽+583804𝛽2+129199𝛽3−134048𝛽4−20648𝛽5+7600𝛽6+280𝛽7−152𝛽8+8𝛽9)65121239+16333554𝛽−6705577𝛽2+1412924𝛽3−22684𝛽4+17840𝛽5+40772𝛽6−11440𝛽7−568𝛽8+288𝛽9−16𝛽10  𝑥𝑗Ⅶ = 4(𝑎−𝑐)(4−𝛽)(−620863−304167𝛽+27340𝛽2−21277𝛽3−2223𝛽4+2734𝛽5−28𝛽6−60𝛽7+4𝛽8)−65121239−16333554𝛽+6705577𝛽2−1412924𝛽3+22684𝛽4−17840𝛽5−40772𝛽6+11440𝛽7+568𝛽8−288𝛽9+16𝛽10  
Then, putting these equilibrium results into (4) and then (2) and (3), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes 
in this case VII. 
𝑞𝑖Ⅶ = 12(𝑎−𝑐)(1580714+785343𝛽−43451𝛽2−30505𝛽3+4803𝛽4−449𝛽5−139𝛽6+36𝛽7−2𝛽8)65121239+16333554𝛽−6705577𝛽2+1412924𝛽3−22684𝛽4+17840𝛽5+40772𝛽6−11440𝛽7−568𝛽8+288𝛽9−16𝛽10  𝑞𝑗Ⅶ = 30(𝑎−𝑐)(620863+304167𝛽−27340𝛽2+21277𝛽3+2223𝛽4−2734𝛽5+28𝛽6+60𝛽7−4𝛽8)65121239+16333554𝛽−6705577𝛽2+1412924𝛽3−22684𝛽4+17840𝛽5+40772𝛽6−11440𝛽7−568𝛽8+288𝛽9−16𝛽10  𝜋𝑖Ⅶ = 4(𝑎−𝑐)2(1517+595𝛽−69𝛽2−20𝛽3+2𝛽4)265121239+16333554𝛽−6705577𝛽2+1412924𝛽3−22684𝛽4+17840𝛽5+40772𝛽6−11440𝛽7−568𝛽8+288𝛽9−16𝛽10  𝜋𝑗Ⅶ = 8(𝑎−𝑐)2(193+16𝛽−2𝛽2)(620863+304167𝛽−27340𝛽2+21277𝛽3+2223𝛽4−2734𝛽5+28𝛽6+60𝛽7−4𝛽8)2(65121239+16333554𝛽−6705577𝛽2+1412924𝛽3−22684𝛽4+17840𝛽5+40772𝛽6−11440𝛽7−568𝛽8+288𝛽9−16𝛽10)2  
15 
 
𝑊Ⅶ = (2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(604454818565702 + 499033155530783𝛽 + 31059959705818𝛽2 − 8689146368490𝛽3 + 16905272721089𝛽4 −
1114914042353𝛽5 − 663813877578𝛽6 + 344122205936𝛽7 − 134890269479𝛽8 − 30428529928𝛽9 + 12467839048𝛽10 + 1041752576𝛽11 −
457612524𝛽12 − 13852400𝛽13 + 9563888𝛽14 − 178752𝛽15 − 108608𝛽16 + 9728𝛽17 − 256𝛽18))/(65121239 + 16333554𝛽 − 6705577𝛽2 + 1412924𝛽3 −
22684𝛽4 + 17840𝛽5 + 40772𝛽6 − 11440𝛽7 − 568𝛽8 + 288𝛽9 − 16𝛽10)2  
Note that (i) qiⅦ ≥ qjⅦ , xiⅦ ≥ xjⅦ  for all β ∈ [0,1]; (ii) πiⅦ >< πjⅦ  if β <> 0.191 . Thus, the same 
results with Case II occur under the asymmetric outcomes, but the threshold of spillovers rate is lower. 
Case Ⅷ. (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2)={(3,1,2), (3,2,1)} 
This case considers a successive sequential-move game where both firms move sequentially and 
the government follows lastly. The first order condition of the government provides the following 
response function: 
𝑠 = 18 (2𝑎 − 2𝑐 + (𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗)(1 + 𝛽))  
Using this response function, firm j chooses R&D to maximize its profit. The first order condition 
of the firm provides the following response function: 
𝑥𝑗 = (7 − 𝛽)(6𝑎 − 6𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖(1 − 7𝛽))239 + 14𝛽 − 𝛽2  
Using these response functions, firm i chooses R&D to maximize its profits. The first order 
condition yields the following asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between the firms: 
𝑠Ⅷ = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(13855 + 4742𝛽 − 768𝛽2 + 362𝛽3 − 47𝛽4)47321 + 9492𝛽 − 4402𝛽2 + 1092𝛽3 − 471𝛽4 + 112𝛽5 − 8𝛽6 
𝑥𝑖Ⅷ = 8(𝑎 − 𝑐)(1015 + 135𝛽 + 128𝛽2 + 32𝛽3 − 15𝛽4 + 𝛽5)47321 + 9492𝛽 − 4402𝛽2 + 1092𝛽3 − 471𝛽4 + 112𝛽5 − 8𝛽6 𝑥𝑗Ⅷ = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(7 − 𝛽)(577 + 202𝛽 − 51𝛽2 + 32𝛽3 − 4𝛽4)47321 + 9492𝛽 − 4402𝛽2 + 1092𝛽3 − 471𝛽4 + 112𝛽5 − 8𝛽6 
Then, putting these equilibrium results into (4) and then (2) and (3), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes 
in this case VIII. 
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𝑞𝑖Ⅷ = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(6931 + 2318𝛽 − 156𝛽2 − 22𝛽3 + 𝛽4)47321 + 9492𝛽 − 4402𝛽2 + 1092𝛽3 − 471𝛽4 + 112𝛽5 − 8𝛽6 𝑞𝑗Ⅷ = 24(𝑎 − 𝑐)(577 + 202𝛽 − 51𝛽2 + 32𝛽3 − 4𝛽4)47321 + 9492𝛽 − 4402𝛽2 + 1092𝛽3 − 471𝛽4 + 112𝛽5 − 8𝛽6 𝜋𝑖Ⅷ = 8(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(29 + 8𝛽 − 𝛽2)247321 + 9492𝛽 − 4402𝛽2 + 1092𝛽3 − 471𝛽4 + 112𝛽5 − 8𝛽6 𝜋𝑗Ⅷ = 4(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(239 + 14𝛽 − 𝛽2)(577 + 202𝛽 − 51𝛽2 + 32𝛽3 − 4𝛽4)2(47321 + 9492𝛽 − 4402𝛽2 + 1092𝛽3 − 471𝛽4 + 112𝛽5 − 8𝛽6)2 𝑊Ⅷ = 4(𝑎−𝑐)2(159163953+120253250𝛽+588897𝛽2−233052𝛽3+2814021𝛽4−1105614𝛽5+304095𝛽6−25080𝛽7−5814𝛽8+960𝛽9−32𝛽10)(47321+9492𝛽−4402𝛽2+1092𝛽3−471𝛽4+112𝛽5−8𝛽6)2   
Note that (i) qiⅧ ≥ qjⅧ , xiⅧ ≥ xjⅧ  for all β ∈ [0,1]; (ii) πiⅧ >< πjⅧ  if β <> 0.143 . Thus, the same 
results with Case II occur under the asymmetric outcomes, but the threshold of spillovers rate is lower. 
5. Endogenous timing game 
We now compare the equilibrium outcomes and find an equilibrium of an endogenous timing game 
between both firms and the government. We first compare the profits of the firms, given the choice of 
the government, and find the equilibrium choices of (TG, TF1, TF2) in the subgames.13 
Lemma 1.  
(1) Suppose 𝑇𝐺 = 1. Then, the equilibrium outcomes between the firms are (1,1,1) if 𝛽 ≤ 0.054 ; 
(1,2,2) if 0.054 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.464; either (1,2,3) or (1,3,2) if 0.464 < 𝛽. 
(2) Suppose 𝑇𝐺 = 2. Then, the equilibrium outcomes between the firms are (2,1,1) if 𝛽 ≤ 0.062 ; 
(2,3,3) if 0.062 < 𝛽. 
(3) Suppose 𝑇𝐺 = 3. Then, the equilibrium outcomes between the firms are (3,1,1) if 𝛽 ≤ 0.143 . 
either (3,1,2) or (3,2,1) if 0.143 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.61 . either (3,1,3) or (3,2,3) or (3,3,1) or (3,3,2) if 0.61 < 𝛽.. 
Lemma 1 shows that there are several different equilibrium timings depending on the rate of 
spillovers and the movement of government. It states that (1) if the government decides to act in the first 
period, then case I, case III, case IV can an equilibrium; (2) if the government decides to act in the 
                            
13 Note that the threshold of spillovers rate for each equilibrium outcome is represented by numbers with three 
decimal place for expositional convenience. All the proofs of lemmas and propositions are provided in Appendix. 
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second period, then case Ⅴ and case III can be an equilibrium; (3) if government decides to act in the 
last period, then case Ⅴ, case Ⅷ, and case Ⅵ can be an equilibrium. Therefore, neither case II nor case 
VII can be an equilibrium. 
We now compare the welfare ranks of W(TG, TF1, TF2), given the firms’ choices in their movements.  
Lemma 2.  
(1) Suppose that 𝑇𝐹1 = 𝑇𝐹2 = 1. Then, 𝑊(1,1,1) >< 𝑊(2,1,1) = 𝑊(3,1,1) if 𝛽 <> 0.096;  
(2) Suppose that 𝑇𝐹1 = 1, 𝑇𝐹2 = 2. Then, 𝑊(1,1,2) >< 𝑊(2,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.101; 𝑊(2,1,2) >< 𝑊(3,1,2) 
if 𝛽 <> 0.096; 𝑊(1,1,2) >< 𝑊(3,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.098; 
(3) Suppose that 𝑇𝐹1 = 1, 𝑇𝐹2 = 3. Then, 𝑊(1,1,3) >< 𝑊(2,1,3) if 𝛽 <> 0.01; 𝑊(2,1,3) > 𝑊(3,1,3) 
for all 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. 
(4) Suppose that 𝑇𝐹1 = 2, 𝑇𝐹2 = 1. Then, 𝑊(1,2,1) >< 𝑊(2,2,1) if 𝛽 <> 0.101; 𝑊(1,2,1) >< 𝑊(3,2,1) 
if 𝛽 <> 0.098; 𝑊(2,2,1) >< 𝑊(3,2,1) if 𝛽 <> 0.096; 
(5) Suppose that 𝑇𝐹1 = 𝑇𝐹2 = 2.  Then, 𝑊(2,2,2) >< 𝑊(3,2,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.096 ;  𝑊(1,2,2) >< 𝑊(3,2,2) 
if 𝛽 <> 0.098; 𝑊(1,2,2) ≥ 𝑊(2,2,2) for all 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]; 
(6) Suppose that 𝑇𝐹1 = 2, 𝑇𝐹2 = 3. Then, 𝑊(2,2,3) >< 𝑊(3,2,3) if 𝛽 <> 0.101; 𝑊(1,2,3) >< 𝑊(3,2,3) 
if 𝛽 <> 0.098; 𝑊(1,2,3) ≥ 𝑊(2,2,3) for all 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. 
(7) Suppose that 𝑇𝐹1 = 3, 𝑇𝐹2 = 1. Then, 𝑊(1,3,1) >< 𝑊(3,3,1) if 𝛽 <> 0.101; 𝑊(1,3,1) >< 𝑊(2,3,1) 
if 𝛽 <> 0.01; 𝑊(2,3,1) > 𝑊(3,3,1) for all 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]; 
(8) Suppose that 𝑇𝐹1 = 3, 𝑇𝐹2 = 2. Then 𝑊(1,3,2) >< 𝑊(3,3,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.098 ; 𝑊(2,3,2) >< 𝑊(3,3,2) 
if 𝛽 <> 0.101; 𝑊(1,3,2) ≥ 𝑊(2,3,2) for all 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]; 
(9) Suppose that 𝑇𝐹1 = 𝑇𝐹2 = 3. Then, 𝑊(1,3,3), (2,3,3) ≥ 𝑊(3,3,3) for all 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. 
Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can obtain the following proposition. 
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Proposition 1. The equilibrium of an endogenous timing game is as follows: 
(1) If 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.054, (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = (1,1,1) 
(2) If 0.054 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.062, (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = (1,2,2)  
(3) If 0.062 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.096, (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = {(1,2,2), (2,3,3)}  
(4) If 0.096 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.098, (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = {(1,2,2), (2,3,3), (3,1,1)}  
(5) If 0.098 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.143, (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = {(2,3,3), (3,1,1)} 
(6) If 0.143 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.61, (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = {(2,3,3), (3,1,2), (3,2,1)} 
(7) If 0.61 < 𝛽 ≤ 1, (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = {(2,3,3), (3,2,3), (3,3,2)} 
Proposition 1 shows some interesting equilibrium outcomes in an endogenous timing game: First, 
a simultaneous-move game (case I) appears if the spillovers rate is very low (0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.054) while 
the government leadership (as a first-mover) with a simultaneous-move game between the firms (case 
III) appears otherwise (0.054 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1). Thus, the spillovers rate is crucial to determine the strategic 
timing of the game between the government and firms. In particular, if the spillovers rate is not so low, 
the commitment of output subsidy policy is attainable in an equilibrium while both firms choose their 
R&D investments simultaneously after observing government policy. These findings are consistent to 
the previous results in the absence of government in which both firms choose simultaneous game when 
the spillovers rate is low while sequential game when the spillovers rate is high. 14  Our analysis 
highlights the role of government policy in determining the strategic choices of R&D activities between 
the firms. It is noteworthy that our findings show unique equilibrium outcomes if the spillovers rate is 
low (0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.096) in which the government has strong incentive to be a leader in the equilibrium.  
Second, the government followership (as a last-mover) appears if the spillovers rate is intermediate 
(0.096 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.61). In special, the government followership accompanying with a simultaneous-move 
game between the firms (case V) appears if 0.096 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.143 while the government followership 
accompanying with a sequential-move game between the firms (case VIII) appears if 0.143 ≤ 𝛽 ≤0.61. This implies that the government might not commit to output subsidy rate and chooses its policy 
                            
14 For example, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Amir and Stepanova (2006) examined an endogenous timing 
game and showed that only a sequential-move game between the firms appears in the equilibrium. While Amir 
(2000) and Leal et al. (2019) considered an endogenous R&D timing game and examined how R&D spillovers 
can affect the equilibrium of R&D choices game. 
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option opportunistically after observing firms’ R&D investments if the spillovers rate is intermediate.15 
This in turn yields that a mixture timing between the firms either simultaneously or sequentially. Further, 
a sequential-move game between the firms produces the results that a leading firm provides higher 
output and R&D investment but its profit is lower. 
Finally, a variant of sequential game where a sequential-move game by one firm’s leadership and 
a simultaneous-move between government and the other firm (case VI) appears if 0.61 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1. That 
is, if the spillovers rate is high, a sequential-move game between the firms appears and at least one of 
the two firms prefers to be a leader. Note that there are also multiple equilibria in this range of spillovers 
wherein the government leadership (as a first-mover) with a simultaneous-move game between the firms 
(case III) also appears. 
6. Welfare comparisons 
We now compare the welfare consequences of the equilibrium outcomes of an endogenous timing 
game between both firms and the government. We first compare welfare ranks among 8 cases in 
choosing the timing of movement. 
Proposition 2. The welfare comparisons provide the followings: 
(1) Case Ⅲ provides the highest welfare if 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.055; 
(2) Case Ⅳ provides the highest welfare if 0.055 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.099; 
(3) Case Ⅴ provides the highest welfare if 0.099 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.143; 
(4) Case Ⅷ provides the highest welfare if 0.143 < 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
Proposition 2 shows the importance of spillovers rate in the welfare ranks: First, the government 
leadership (as a first-mover) with a simultaneous-move game between the firms (case III) provides the 
highest welfare when the spillovers rate is very low ( 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.055 ). Second, the government 
leadership (as a first-mover) with a sequential-move game between the firms (case IV) provides the 
highest welfare when the spillovers rate is low ( 0.055 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.099 ). Third, the government 
                            
15 Lee et al. (2019) compared irreversible R&D and flexible R&D in the presence of government policy, and 
highlighted the significant role of research spillovers, which yields contrasting results in equilibrium outcomes. 
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followership (as a last-mover) with a simultaneous-move game between the firms (case V) provides the 
highest welfare when the spillovers rate is not low (0.099 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.143 ). Finally, the government 
followership (as a last-mover) with a sequential-move game between the firms (case VIII) provides the 
highest welfare when the spillovers rate is high (0.143 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1). Therefore, the mixture timing between 
the government and both firms in either simultaneous or sequential manner is not socially desirable. 
Finally, proposition 1 and proposition 2 yield the following proposition:  
Proposition 3. The equilibrium outcome of an endogenous timing game can be socially desirable in the 
following cases that (i) (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = (1,2,2) if 0.054 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.055 (ii) (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = (3,1,1) if 0.099 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.143, and (iii) (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = {(3,1,2), (3,2,1)} if 0.143 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.61. Otherwise, the 
equilibrium outcomes are not socially desirable. 
Proposition 3 provides the welfare consequences of the equilibrium outcomes of an endogenous 
timing game: In particular, it implies that (i) the equilibrium with the government leadership (as a first-
mover) and a simultaneous-move game between the firms (case III) provides the highest welfare when 0.054 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.055 ; (ii) the equilibrium with the government followership (as a last-mover) and a 
simultaneous-move game between the firms (case V) provides the highest welfare when 0.099 ≤ 𝛽 ≤0.143; (iii) the equilibrium with the government followership (as a last-mover) and a sequential-move 
game between the firms (case VIII) provides the highest welfare when 0.143 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.61. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper is the first to consider the strategic relationship between R&D investments and output 
subsidies in the presence of research spillovers in an observable delay game with three-period and three-
player model. We investigated an endogenous timing game among the government and firms under 
Cournot output competition, and found that the spillovers rate is crucial to determine the strategic timing 
of the game. 
First, a simultaneous-move game appears at equilibrium if the spillovers rate is very low while the 
government leadership (as a first-mover) appears otherwise. That is, if the spillovers rate is not very low, 
the government has strong incentive to be a leader, which is socially desirable. Second, the government 
followership (as a last-mover) appears at equilibrium if the spillovers rate is intermediate, which can 
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provide the highest welfare irrespective of whether the firms play a simultaneous-move game or a 
sequential-move game. That is, if the spillovers rate is intermediate, the government has strong incentive 
to be a follower, which is also socially desirable. Finally, a sequential-move game by a firm’s leadership 
with a simultaneous-move game between government and the other firm appears at equilibrium if the 
spillovers rate is high. However, there is a welfare loss in this equilibrium. 
Although there are limitations because of its model-specific assumptions in our model, we believe 
that our implications on R&D policy are useful in the endogenous timing game. However, it is required 
to examine the robustness of our findings under other market structures with differentiated products in 
oligopolistic competition. Finally, considering the increasing importance of the other governmental 
instruments, extending this model into mixed markets with/without R&D subsidy policy remains for the 
future research. 
Appendix 
A1. Proof of Lemma 1 
(1) When 𝑇𝐺 = 1, firm 1’s profit ranks are as follows: (i) 𝜋1(1,1,1) ><  𝜋1(1,2,1) if 𝛽 <> 0.054; (ii) 𝜋1(1,1,2) ><  𝜋1(1,2,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.054 ; 𝜋1(1,1,2) >< 𝜋1(1,3,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.06 ; 𝜋1(1,2,2) >< 𝜋1(1,3,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.353; (iii) 𝜋1(1,1,2) >< 𝜋1(1,2,3) if 𝛽 <> 0.058; 𝜋1(1,2,2) >< 𝜋1(1,2,3) if 𝛽 <> 0.464.  
Also, firm 2’s profit ranks are as follows: (i) 𝜋2(1,1,1) ><  𝜋2(1,1,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.054 ; (ii) 𝜋2(1,2,1) ><  𝜋2(1,2,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.054 ; 𝜋2(1,2,1) >< 𝜋2(1,2,3)  if 𝛽 <> 0.06 ; 𝜋2(1,2,2) >< 𝜋2(1,2,3)  if 𝛽 <> 0.353 ; (iii) 𝜋2(1,2,1) >< 𝜋2(1,2,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.054 ; 𝜋2(1,2,1) >< 𝜋2(1,3,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.058 ; 𝜋2(1,2,2) >< 𝜋2(1,3,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.464.  
Hence, comparing the profits ranks between the firms provides an equilibrium choices of timing between 
the firms when 𝑇𝐺 = 1.  
(2) When 𝑇𝐺 = 2 , firm 1’s profit ranks are as follows: (i) 𝜋1(2,1,1) ><  𝜋1(2,2,1)  if 𝛽 <> 0.595 ; 𝜋1(2,1,1) ><  𝜋1(2,3,1)  if 𝛽 <> 0.062 ; 𝜋1(2,2,1) ><  𝜋1(2,3,1)  if 𝛽 <> 0.052 ; (ii) 𝜋1(2,1,2) >𝜋1(2,2,2)  for all 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] ; 𝜋1(2,3,2) >< 𝜋1(2,1,2)  if 𝛽 >< 0.063 ; 𝜋1(2,2,2) ><  𝜋1(2,3,2)  if 
22 
 
𝛽 <> 0.054 ; (iii) 𝜋1(2,1,3) > 𝜋1(2,2,3)  for all 𝛽  𝜋1(2,3,3) >< 𝜋1(2,1,3)  if 𝛽 >< 0.062 ; 𝜋1(2,2,3) >< 𝜋1(2,3,3) if 𝛽 <> 0.054.  
Also, firm 2’s profit ranks are as follows: (i) 𝜋2(2,1,1) ><  𝜋2(2,1,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.595 ; 𝜋2(2,1,1) ><  𝜋2(2,1,3)  if 𝛽 <> 0.062 ; 𝜋2(2,1,2) ><  𝜋2(2,1,3)  if 𝛽 <> 0.052 ; (ii) 𝜋2(2,2,1) >𝜋2(2,2,2) for all 𝛽 ; 𝜋2(2,2,3) >< 𝜋2(2,2,1) if 𝛽 >< 0.063 ; 𝜋2(2,2,2) ><  𝜋2(2,2,3) if 𝛽 <> 0.054 ; (iii) 𝜋2(2,3,1) > 𝜋2(2,3,2)  for all 𝛽 ; 𝜋2(2,3,3) >< 𝜋2(2,3,1)  if 𝛽 >< 0.062 ; 𝜋2(2,3,2) >< 𝜋2(2,3,3)  if 𝛽 <> 0.054.  
Hence, comparing the profits ranks between the firms provides an equilibrium choices of timing between 
the firms when 𝑇𝐺 = 2. 
(3) When 𝑇𝐺 = 3 , firm 1’s profit ranks are as follows: (i) 𝜋1(3,1,1) ><  𝜋1(3,2,1)  if 𝛽 <> 0.143 ; 𝜋1(3,1,1) ><  𝜋1(3,3,1) if 𝛽 <> 0.595 ; 𝜋1(3,2,1) >  𝜋1(3,3,1) for all 𝛽 ; (ii) 𝜋1(3,1,2) > 𝜋1(3,1,1) 
for all 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] ; 𝜋1(3,3,2) >< 𝜋1(3,1,2)  if 𝛽 >< 0.61 ; 𝜋1(3,1,1) ><  𝜋1(3,3,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.595 ; (iii) 𝜋1(3,1,3), (3,2,3) > 𝜋1(3,3,3) for all 𝛽.  
Also, firm 2’s profit ranks are as follows: (i) 𝜋2(3,1,1) ><  𝜋2(3,1,2)  if 𝛽 <> 0.143 ; 𝜋2(3,1,1) ><  𝜋2(3,1,3) if 𝛽 <> 0.595 ; 𝜋2(3,1,2) >  𝜋2(3,1,3) for all 𝛽 ; (ii) 𝜋2(3,2,1) > 𝜋2(3,1,1) 
for all 𝛽 ; 𝜋2(3,2,3) >< 𝜋2(3,2,1)  if 𝛽 >< 0.61 ; 𝜋2(3,1,1) ><  𝜋2(3,2,3)  if 𝛽 <> 0.595 ; (iii) 𝜋2(3,3,1), (3,3,2) > 𝜋2(3,3,3) for all 𝛽.  
Hence, comparing the profits ranks between the firms provides an equilibrium choices of timing between 
the firms when 𝑇𝐺 = 3. 
A2. Proof of Proposition 1 
Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can obtain the following relations where the government and both 
firms do not want to deviate from their choices 
(1) .(𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = (1,1,1) can be an equilibrium if 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.054. 
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(2) (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = (1,2,2) can be an equilibrium if 0.054 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.098. 
(3) (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = (2,3,3) can be an equilibrium if 0.062 < 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
(4) (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = (3,1,1) can be an equilibrium if 0.096 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.143. 
(5) (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = {(3,1,2), (3,2,1)} can be an equilibrium if 0.143 < 𝛽 ≤ 0.61. 
(6) (𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2) = {(3,2,3), (3,3,2)} can be an equilibrium if 0.61 < 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
Arranging these results provides the equilibrium of endogenous timing game. 
A3. Proof of Proposition 2 
Due to the symmetry, we have the equivalence in welfare rankings in the same case. Hence, we need to 
compare the following 8 cases in the W(𝑇𝐺 , 𝑇𝐹1, 𝑇𝐹2). Then, we have the following welfare comparisons: 
(1) Case I: 𝑊(1,1,1) = 𝑊(2,2,2) = (3,3,3) 
 𝑊(1,1,1) >< 𝑊(1,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.055;  
 𝑊(1,1,1) ≤ 𝑊(1,2,2) where equality holds only if 𝛽 = 0.053. 
 𝑊(1,1,1) >< 𝑊(1,3,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.055. 
 𝑊(1,1,1) >< 𝑊(2,1,1) if 𝛽 <> 0.096. 
 𝑊(1,1,1) >< 𝑊(2,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.096. 
 𝑊(1,1,1) >< 𝑊(2,1,3) if 𝛽 <> 0.095. 
 𝑊(1,1,1) >< 𝑊(3,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.096. 
(2) Case II: 𝑊(1,1,2) = 𝑊(1,1,3) = 𝑊(2,2,3) = 𝑊(1,2,1) = 𝑊(1,3,1) = 𝑊(2,3,2) 
 𝑊(1,1,2) ≥ 𝑊(1,2,2) if 0.055 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.122 or 0.643 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
 𝑊(1,1,2) ≤ 𝑊(1,3,2) where equality holds only if 𝛽 = 0.058. 
 𝑊(1,1,2) >< 𝑊(2,1,1) if 𝛽 <> 0.098. 
 𝑊(1,1,2) >< 𝑊(2,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.101. 
 𝑊(1,1,2) >< 𝑊(2,1,3) if 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.1. 
 𝑊(1,1,2) >< 𝑊(3,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.098. 
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(3) Case III: 𝑊(1,2,2) = 𝑊(1,3,3) = 𝑊(2,3,3): 
 𝑊(1,2,2) >< 𝑊(1,3,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.055. 
 𝑊(1,2,2) >< 𝑊(2,1,1) if 𝛽 <> 0.098. 
 𝑊(1,2,2) >< 𝑊(2,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.1. 
 𝑊(1,2,2) >< 𝑊(2,1,3) if 𝛽 <> 0.099. 
 𝑊(1,2,2) >< 𝑊(3,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.098. 
(4) Case IV: 𝑊(1,3,2) = 𝑊(1,2,3): 
 𝑊(1,3,2) <> 𝑊(2,1,1) if 𝛽 >< 0.099. 
 𝑊(1,3,2) <> 𝑊(2,1,2) if 𝛽 >< 0.102. 
 𝑊(1,3,2) ≤ 𝑊(2,1,3) if 0.101 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
 𝑊(1,3,2) >< 𝑊(3,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.099. 
(5) Case V: 𝑊(2,1,1) = 𝑊(3,1,1) = 𝑊(3,2,2): 
 𝑊(2,1,1) >< 𝑊(2,1,2) if 𝛽 >< 0.096. 
 𝑊(2,1,1) ≥ 𝑊(2,1,3) if 0.097 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.756. 
 𝑊(2,1,1) >< 𝑊(3,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.143. 
(6) Case VI: 𝑊(2,1,2) = 𝑊(3,1,3) = 𝑊(3,2,3) = 𝑊(2,2,1) = 𝑊(3,3,1) = 𝑊(3,3,2): 
 𝑊(2,1,2) < 𝑊(2,1,3) for all 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. 
 𝑊(2,1,2) >< 𝑊(3,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.096. 
(7) Case VII: 𝑊(2,1,3) = 𝑊(2,3,1): 
 𝑊(2,1,3) >< 𝑊(3,1,2) if 𝛽 <> 0.097. 
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